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Pharmaceutical M&A Activity: Effects on Prices,
Innovation, and Competition
Barak Richman, Will Mitchell, Elena Vidal, & Kevin Schulman*
The rise of blockbuster pharmaceutical acquisitions has prompted
fears that unprecedented market concentration will weaken competition.
Two of the most prominent concerns focus on the upstream and
downstream ends of the pharmaceutical industry: (1) the concern that
these mergers will concentrate the market for discovery and will
therefore lead to fewer discoveries; and (2) the concern that merging
large marketing, sales, and distribution forces will strengthen the hands
of select pharmaceutical manufacturers and weaken downstream
competition. Having considered potential dynamic effects in the industry
and conducted a series of preliminary interviews with knowledgeable
observers, though, this Article argues that neither of these common fears
is systematically warranted. There are, however, potential dangers in
market concentration at an intermediate stage during the discovery-todevelopment path: the stage for regulatory approval. These preliminary
findings are a product of dramatic changes that are currently reshaping
the structure of the pharmaceutical industry. This Article discusses how
these structural changes contribute to the current merger wave, how
dynamic responses by industry players in response to the merger wave
mitigate the potential harm from competition, and how the political arena
might still offer threats to market concentration.
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INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry’s contributions to global health and
economic development make it one of the most important commercial
sectors in the world. Worldwide sales of pharmaceutical products
reached about $1 trillion in 2015,1 and the value of the industry’s many
lifesaving discoveries vastly exceeds that figure.
At the same time, the sector is also highly controversial and has long
raised concerns about pricing, marketing, and product development
strategies. The industry recently triggered renewed criticism when firms
such as Turing, Horizon, and Valeant engineered dramatic price increases
for generic products, and Gilead and Mylan made significant price
demands for specialized drugs for Hepatitis C treatments and the EpiPen.2
With a renewed sense that reducing pharmaceutical prices is central to
making health care affordable, and with a renewed hope that vigorous
antitrust enforcement might lead the way, these events reminded
policymakers and antitrust practitioners of the importance of mergers and
acquisitions (“M&A”) by pharmaceutical firms.
Although M&A have been a staple in the pharmaceutical industry for
over a century, recent mergers of industry giants—particularly over the
past decade or so—mark an unprecedented level of consolidation. Giants
are now acquiring other giants, and concern has appropriately emerged
for whether such acquisitions harm the competitive marketplace and
1. QUINTILESIMS, TOP LINE MARKET DATA: TOP 20 GLOBAL PRODUCTS 2015, 1,
https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/TopLine%20Market%20Data/Top_20_Global_Products_2015.pdf (last visited May 16, 2017).
2. Daniel Kozarich, Mylan’s EpiPen Pricing Crossed Ethical Boundaries, FORTUNE (Sept. 27,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/mylan-epipen-heather-bresch/; Robert Langreth, How
Gilead Priced Its $20 Billion Blockbuster, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2015, 4:37 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-10/behind-the-1-000-pill-a-formula-forprofits-inside-gilead; Johnathan D. Rockoff & Ed Silverman, Pharmaceutical Companies Buy
Rivals’ Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2015, 9:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pharmaceutical-companies-buy-rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-prices1430096431; Valeant & Shkreli-led Turing Bought Drugs to Hike Prices, Documents Allege, CBC
NEWS (Feb. 2, 2016, 2:39 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/drug-prices-shkreli-valeantturing-1.3430639 [hereinafter Valeant & Shkreli-led Turing].
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innovation pipelines.
Fears that mergers will weaken competition raise two predominant
concerns, each respectively focusing on the upstream and downstream
ends of the pharmaceutical industry. Upstream, the fear is that mergers
of large research and development (“R&D”) operations might
concentrate the market for discovery, reduce competition and
experimentation for new discoveries, and therefore lead to fewer
discoveries. Downstream, the concern is that merging large marketing,
sales, and distribution forces might strengthen the hands of select
pharmaceutical manufacturers and weaken downstream competition,
which could then reduce pricing pressures and increase distribution
barriers to innovative new competitors. These concerns prompted some
policymakers and consumer activists to warn that merger activity in the
pharmaceutical sector is reaching a tipping point that threatens increased
prices, reduces incentives for innovation, and reveals other structural
reckonings in the industry.3
By contrast, other voices are less concerned about the mergers. Rather
than reduce innovativeness, mergers might generate more productive
focus and greater economies of scale that actually promote development
activities. And rather than reduce competition and experimentation,
mergers might open doors for innovative new entrants. Thus, both policy
and corporate strategy would benefit from a deeper understanding of
when mergers will harm competition and when they might benefit the
larger marketplace.
This Article reviews theory and some evidence that articulates the
likely consequences of M&A deals in the pharmaceutical industry. It
offers an exploratory analysis of industry trends and concludes that M&A
activity appears to play only a limited role in current pricing
controversies, although antitrust caution is relevant with some targeted
deals. The stakes for innovative activity, meanwhile, are higher, but this
Article’s analysis suggests that merger activity is frequently associated
with more active product pipelines and appears central to an ongoing
innovation strategy in a dynamic global scientific and market
environment. In some conditions, though, M&A activity may create risks
of dampening innovative capability, so that there is some potential for
antitrust assessment of R&D productivity. The implications from our
findings suggest an industry where most acquisitions are a product of
important technological and geopolitical changes, rather than a tool to
3. Peter Young, Biotech Financial and M&A Trends—Two Steps Forward, One Step Back,
PHARMEXEC.COM (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.pharmexec.com/biotech-financial-and-ma-trendstwo-steps-forward-one-step-back.
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consolidate pricing or market power. We do, however, find some
potential dangers in market concentration at an intermediate stage during
the discovery-to-development path: the stage for regulatory approval.
This Article begins with an overview of the industry’s recent surge in
M&A activity. It then examines whether this M&A activity increased
industry-wide concentration, increased prices, or reduced innovative
output. After exploring suggestive empirical evidence that industry
M&A activity has led to neither industry-wide price increases nor a
reduction in innovation, this Article explores two alternative and less
traditional anticompetitive concerns from industry megamergers:
industry concentration in marketing, sales and distribution of
pharmaceuticals, and concentration in the regulatory process of seeking
approval for new products. Overall, the sector’s history and performance
suggest nuanced implications for antitrust policy in the pharmaceutical
sector, as policy ought to pay careful attention to certain regulatory and
market structures as well as broad trends in a changing global industry.
I. BACKGROUND: TRENDS IN PHARMACEUTICAL MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS
M&A deals in the pharmaceutical industry date back to the industry’s
origins. The four companies of Glaxo, Wellcome, Beecham, and
SmithKline typify the industry’s development. Each of the four
companies began in the early 1800s, and grew by making between six
and eleven significant acquisitions, as well as many dozens of smaller
acquisitions, through the 1980s. But as the industry approached the later
part of the twentieth century, the trend of commonplace acquisitions was
supplemented with what are commonly called “blockbuster mergers.” In
1989, SmithKline merged with Beecham in a $7.7 billion deal; in 1995,
Glaxo merged with Wellcome in a $15 billion deal; and in 2000, GlaxoWellcome merged with SmithKline-Beecham in a (then-unprecedented)
$76 billion deal.4
This history not only reveals that pharmaceutical acquisitions are as
old as the industry, but it also reflects how M&A activity has steadily
increased since the 1980s. The blockbuster merger trend continued
through 2008, which exhibited fifteen megadeals that each totaled over
$1 billion, led by the Roche’s acquisition of Genentech for nearly $100
billion, and reached historic highs in both numbers and values of deals in
4. The mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) deal that created GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) in 2000
was the latest in more than fifty substantial deals since 1859 involving predecessors of the company,
including Glaxo, Welcome, Beckman, Beecham, and SmithKline.
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recent years.5 Figure 1 illustrates the growth in pharmaceutical M&A
activity and reveals that the number of annual deals grew from
approximately one hundred deals in the late 1980s, to almost 800 deals
in 2015.6 Industry-wide deal value reached almost $400 billion in 2015,
for about 250 deals with reported value.7
FIGURE 1: Global Trends in Announced Pharma M&A (Acquirer in
Standard Industry Classification (“SIC”) 2834), 1986–2015.8
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

0

A conventional wisdom developed to describe the recent emergence of
megamergers. To extract maximum value from blockbuster drugs, firms
invest sunk costs in marketing and distribution. When a firm’s
blockbuster drug loses its patent protection, the firm needs to find other
high-volume, high-margin drugs to supply its marketing mechanisms. If
it has no compounds within its development pipeline that can suitably
utilize these mechanisms, the firm purchases another pharmaceutical
company that owns patents for major compounds that can utilize its
5. James Fontanella-Khan, Pharma M&A for 2016 Continues to Surge, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9adbce94-c902-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0.
6. See infra Figure 1 (depicting global M&A trends). This calculation is based on data from
Thomson Reuters’ Investment Banking Deal Activity. SDC Platinum Database, THOMSON
REUTERS,
http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/market-data/sdcplatinum-financial-securities.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
7. Recap Database, THOMSON REUTERS, http://recap.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
8. The source of Figure 1’s data is the Authors’ calculations based on the Thomson Reuters
“SDC Platinum” database. SDC Platinum Database, supra note 6.
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regulatory and marketing capacities. Thus, one explanation for the
acquisition trend is that long-term investments in marketing and
distribution trigger purchases for new discoveries. When large
pharmaceutical firms cannot fill their marketing channels, they acquire
companies to maintain a steady supply.
This interpretation of the acquisition spree, therefore, suggests that
acquisitions constitute efforts to compensate for the lack of discovery by
leading pharmaceutical companies. To utilize sunk investments in
marketing and distribution, large pharmaceutical companies must acquire
other companies with profitable discoveries when these acquirers are not
producing valuable discoveries themselves. This is the conclusion
reached by William Haseltine, who laments that the merger trend
“reflects the failure of each company to discover and develop its own
replacement pipeline.”9
A related lament is that because pharmaceutical firms enter into M&A
transactions because they fail to develop new compounds, they also
merge to hide larger shortcomings. Danzon et al. (2007) observe not only
that mergers are a response to financial trouble, but that they are not a
solution, either.10 They observe that financial hardship and patent
expirations largely drive mergers, yet merged firms (after controlling for
these troubles) experience slower profit growth than nonmerged firms.11
Other anecdotal evidence confirms that the absorption costs of mergers
are substantial enough to counteract many of the potential benefits of
mergers.12 These findings suggest that mergers might result from
executive agency costs rather than from efforts to increase shareholder
value.
Thus, the conventional wisdom interprets the current merger spree as
a reflection of a faltering industry. Firms that initiate mergers do so
because they suffer from weak returns and exhibit inadequate innovation,
and these mergers are then burdened by high integration costs and low
profitability. In this view, public policy, perhaps through merger review,
should then intervene to discourage mergers of large pharmaceutical
companies. If, after all, mergers are products of agency costs and reduced
firm value, then any proffered efficiencies defense that justifies additional
9. William Haseltine, Why Big Pharma Mergers Magnify Failures, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/03/why-big-pharma-mergers-magnifyfailures/16892/.
10. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech
Industries 4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10536, 2004).
11. Id. at 29–33.
12. A.T. KEARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY (Aug.
2010), https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/256759/MA_in_Healthcare.pdf/6f7857c380d5-4020-89fc-8ef86abb94bc.
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market concentration should be rejected. And, if mergers are evidence of
shortcomings in pharmaceutical innovation, then perhaps policymakers
should address this more foundational concern.
But this conventional wisdom rests on two flawed assumptions. First,
it assumes implicitly or explicitly that the established firms should be the
source of most major innovations; second, it assumes a static perspective
on an industry that is undergoing significant structural change. The drugdevelopment universe is a collection of heterogeneous firms and
researchers, far more than what a few sets of large corporate labs could
cover. The industry has always relied on R&D and on firm heterogeneity
to innovate, and a diversity of research strategies and skills is only
increasing as biological and other drug forms assume growing
significance to medical care. Innovative outcomes are more likely to
cover a wider space of activity and output if the industry structure
includes a wide variety of players in multiple geographic locations.
Consequently, rather than deliberating over how many established drug
firms are necessary to generate optimal innovation, it might be more
useful to understand the processes that maintain and generate industry
heterogeneity.
Thus, even if the industry’s largest firms are merging out of
weaknesses, and even if these mergers fail to correct those weaknesses,
these firms’ failings do not mean that the industry as a whole is faltering.
Those fearing both the causes and consequences of concentration look to
large pharmaceutical firms to be the industry’s profit leaders, primary
sources of innovation, and principal avenues for marketing. But reports
from industry leaders and reviews of medical research suggest that the
industry is moving away from traditional sources of innovation; that
physicians writing prescriptions are relying on new sources of
information; and that large pharmaceutical firms are carving out a
narrower space in the market for drug development, leaving important
innovative space for entrants and specialists.
These changes color any evaluation of recent megamergers and
suggest that their consequences—and the consequences of other changes
in the industry’s landscape—are far less certain. What is certain,
however, is that the surge in acquisitions reflects a market that is both in
transition and ripe for further study. Among the most pressing questions
are whether these mergers permitted the accumulation of market power
that led to higher prices, and whether these mergers reduced innovation
activity.
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II. PHARMACEUTICAL ACQUISITIONS, PRICE EFFECTS, AND PRICING
STRATEGIES
Pharmaceutical prices in the United States have unquestionably
increased substantially in the past two to five years. 13 How much the
increases stem from M&A, though, is a question with a more ambiguous
answer. Well-publicized examples in which firms such as Turing,
Horizon, and Valeant purchased companies with older products and then
raised the prices of their products, often by many multiples, are highly
visible.14 These companies also drew criticism from imposing high
prices for specialized drugs, such as Gilead’s Hepatitis C treatments and
Mylan’s EpiPen for allergic reactions.15 Yet established drug companies
such as Pfizer and others have also steadily increased list prices during
the past few years.16 It is beyond dispute that rising pharmaceutical
prices pose fiscal dangers to both private and public budgets. 17 It is not
clear, however, whether the rising pharmaceutical prices stemmed from
increased concentration in the industry.
Figure 2 estimates industry concentration based on the Hirschman
Herfindahl Index (“HHI”) for both the global and United States
pharmaceutical markets.18 It appears that overall concentration in the
13. Visualizing Health Policy: Recent Trends in Prescription Drug Costs, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://kff.org/infographic/visualizing-health-policy-recent-trends-in-prescriptiondrug-costs/.
14. See Valeant & Shkreli-led Turing, supra note 2 (discussing both Valeant & Turing’s
purchase of older drugs and raising the prices); see Rockoff & Silverman, supra note 2 (describing
Valeant’s purchase of life-saving heart drugs, and increasing the prices by 525 percent and 212
percent).
15. See Kozarich, supra note 2 (noting EpiPen’s price increase from $100 in 2009 to $608 in
2017); Langreth, supra note 2 (noting Gilead’s price increase to $1,000 per pill for a twelve-week
treatment for Hepatitis C).
16. Ed Silverman, Pfizer Just Raised Drug Prices by an Average of Nearly 9 Percent, STAT
NEWS (June 9, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/06/09/pfizer-drug-prices-turingvaleant/.
17. Bradford R. Hirsch et al., The Impact of Specialty Pharmaceuticals as Drivers of Health
Care Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1718 (2014); Ifrad Islam, Rising Cost of Drugs: Where Do We
Go
from
Here?,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/08/31/rising-cost-of-drugs-where-do-we-go-from-here
(“The
increase in drug costs—projected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of the
Actuary to be 12.6 percent in 2014—has far outpaced inflation, which has hovered between zero
and 2 percent over the last three years; it has also outstripped growth in other medical costs.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), in its 2013 annual medical cost trend report, projected overall
cost growth to be 6.5 percent in 2014 in the large employer market. In stark contrast, a recent
Express Scripts analysis declared a 13.1 percent increase in prescription drug spend in the same
period.”).
18. See infra Figure 2 (depicting the concentration in the pharmaceutical industry). The
Hirschman Herfindahl Index (“HHI”) is a commonly accepted measure of concentration designed
to reflect the pricing power that market actors have. It is calculated by summing the squares of the
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industry is both low and relatively stable; the 500–700 range is well
below the Department of Justice’s guidelines that consider HHI between
1,500 and 2,500 points to be moderately concentrated.19 Figure 2
demonstrates that recent price increases do not appear to correlate with
market power based on greater overall concentration in the industry.
FIGURE 2: Pharmaceutical Industry Concentration, Measured by
HHI, 1998–2015.20
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Additionally, increases in list prices for drugs can be somewhat
misleading because they represent actual market prices. Insurance
companies, hospital systems, pharmaceutical benefit managers
(“PBMs”), and other payors with market power commonly negotiate deep
discounts from list prices through a system of rebates and chargebacks.
The health care industry has seen high levels of provider and payor
consolidation in the last two decades due to inadequate antitrust
enforcement. This consolidation raised health care prices for consumers
while simultaneously enhancing market power of providers and payors
when demanding discounts from pharmaceutical manufacturers.21 While
percentage market shares held by each firm in the market. For example, an industry consisting of
two firms with market shares of 70 percent and 30 percent has an HHI of 70²+30², or 5,800. An
industry with five firms, each with a 20 percent market share, is 20²+20²+20²+20²+20², or 2,000.
It ranges from near-zero (for a perfectly competitive marketplace with many firms, each with very
negligible market shares), to 10,000 for a monopoly.
19. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
20. The source of Figure 2’s data is from the Authors’ calculations, based on sales data from
company annual reports (HHI is the sum of squared market shares).
21. BARAK D. RICHMAN, CONCENTRATION IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS: CHRONIC PROBLEMS
AND
BETTER
SOLUTIONS
13
(JUNE
2012),
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these negotiations are typically confidential and nontransparent, there are
suggestions that discounts can reach as high as 40–50 percent off the
listed prices.22 Other customers, such as the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs (“VA”) and Medicaid in the United States, also typically
receive prices at a discount from list prices (the VA through direct
negotiation and Medicaid through statutory rebates).23 Even with such
discounts, overall drug spending is increasing in the United States and in
many other countries.24
Instead of prices correlating systematically with industry
concentration, it seems that individual price increases are products of
specific market structures and opportunities. Specifically, recent price
increases appear to have emerged from changes in firm strategies rather
than arising from an increase in overall market power. Some instances
of price increases are consequences of firms exploiting opportunities to
raise prices on generic drugs with few competing products. More
generally, many established proprietary drug companies are placing
greater emphasis on specialty drugs, including drugs based on traditional
small cell science and those stemming from the biological science
revolution, that have few competitors in their targeted market segments.25
While these strategies reflect the presence of market power (i.e., there are
few competing products in the biofunctional space where these price
increases take place), they appear uncorrelated with changes in industrywide concentration arising from M&A trends. Instead, they reflect
changes in market segmentation strategy, in which firms target medical
needs where there are few competing products.
This suggests that market power is better measured not in industrywide measures, but instead along functional equivalents, which is how
antitrust regulators typically scrutinize proposed acquisitions. More
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5378&context=faculty_scholarship.
22. Carolyn Y. Johnson, Secret Rebates, Coupons and Exclusions: How the Battle over High
Drug Prices
Is
Really Being
Fought,
WASH. POST (May 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/12/the-drug-price-arms-race-thatleaves-patients-caught-in-the-middle/.
23. David Blumenthal & David Squires, Drug Price Control: How Some Government Programs
Do
It,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(May
10,
2016),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/may/drug-price-control-how-somegovernment-programs-do-it.
24. Tor Constantino, IMS Health Study: U.S. Drug Spending Growth Reaches 8.5 Percent in
2015, QUINTILESIMS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.imshealth.com/en/about-us/news/ims-healthstudy-us-drug-spending-growth-reaches-8.5-percent-in-2015.
25. Gregory Judd & Randy Vogenberg, Planning a Specialty Drug Strategy Through 2020,
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (May 4, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hrtopics/benefits/pages/specialty-drug-strategy.aspx.
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important, it suggests that pricing strategies will continue along a
segmentation strategy, in which firms will seek market rigidity or a
market niche in which there is a lag in opportunities for competitors to
respond with competing products.
Such lags are highly sensitive to the surrounding regulatory framework
that facilitates or deters entry. The primary source of such lags in the
United States is the pharmaceutical regulatory system under the United
States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). This time, lag means that
companies with few, or no, competitors that raise prices on generic drugs
will have the market to themselves until another firm is able to bring a
competing drug through the Abbreviated New Drug Approval (“ANDA”)
process, which often takes several years.26 Similarly, a company that
introduces a breakthrough drug at high prices will have the market to
themselves until competitors are able to discover, develop, and bring
competing drugs through the New Drug Approval (“NDA”) or Biological
Licensing Approval (“BLA”) process; this, again, can take several
years.27
Reciprocally, market structures also allow for competitive reactions
that limit pricing power. In many instances, new drugs that reach the
market do lower list prices, deepen discounts, and reduce consumer
prices. For instance, the introduction of AbbVie’s Viekira Pak into the
Hepatitis C market in 2016 led to extensive price competition with Gilead
based on discounts in the tens of thousands of dollars to pharmaceutical
insurance and benefit management companies.28 Similarly, Mylan
steadily increased the list price of its patent-protected EpiPen. When
Mylan acquired the product in 2007, the list price was a little over $100,
but its current price is over $600, largely reflecting strong market
preference for the company’s proprietary technology for injecting the
allergic reaction drug.29 Mylan indicated that it will also be launching a
26. Clay P. Wiske et al., Options to Promote Competitive Generics Markets in the United States,
314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2129, 2129 (Nov. 24, 2015).
27. For example, Gilead’s breakthrough drugs—Sovaldi (introduced in 2013) and Harvoni
(introduced in 2014) for the treatment of Hepatitis C—had list prices in the United States (before
discounts) approaching $100,000 per treatment regimen. See Paul Demko, New Hepatitis C Drug
Costs
Nearly
$100,000,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Oct.
11,
2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141011/MAGAZINE/310119928.
28. Max Nisen, Prices for the Miracle Drugs That Cure Hepatitis C Are Collapsing, QUARTZ
(Feb. 5, 2015), http://qz.com/338840/prices-for-the-miracle-drugs-that-cure-hepatitis-c-arecollapsing/.
29. Max Jacobs, Don’t Blame Mylan for High Drug Prices, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2016, 2:27 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/11/07/dont-blame-mylan-for-high-drugprices/#5927e2a3ed5b; Mannching Sherry Ku, Recent Trends in Specialty Pharma Business
Model, 23 J. FOOD & DRUG ANALYSIS 595, 597 (2015).
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generic version at about half the price, in anticipation of Teva
Pharmaceuticals launching a generic competitor, while continuing to
offer the branded product.30 Again, while this is a market power issue,
the pricing questions have little to do with industry-wide M&A trends.
Indeed, industry reports in early 2017 suggest that alternatives to the
EpiPen were rapidly eroding Mylan’s market share.31
To the degree that market segmentation strategies are primarily
responsible for price increases, it means that antitrust authorities should
scrutinize specific biofunctional markets and evaluate mergers on
whether a consolidated entity will have new pricing power within a
specific pharmacological space or deter the entry of a pharmaceutical
competitor. If AbbVie, for instance, were to seek to purchase Gilead,
there could be a case for evaluating the deal because it would eliminate
all competition within a specific biofunctional market. Similarly, Teva’s
recent acquisition of Allergan’s generic drug lines warranted examination
for potential market power in some product classes.32 But despite
specific mergers that aggregate market power within a discernable
submarket, it is not clear that the general trend in M&A activity warrants
suspicion in terms of its impact on prices. The larger lesson is that
maintaining a competitive pharmaceutical marketplace requires assessing
and improving the surrounding regulatory structure, more so than
deterring megamergers.
III. M&A AND R&D—A CHANGING MARKET FOR DISCOVERY
Perhaps even more important than the potential impact on prices, some
observers and theorists suggest that M&A activity in the pharmaceutical
sector might reduce innovative activity in the industry. 33 Commentators
30. Linda A. Johnson & Tom Murphy, Drugmaker Mylan Launching Cheaper EpiPen
Following
Price-Hike
Backlash,
TORONTO
STAR
(Aug.
29,
2016),
https://www.thestar.com/business/2016/08/29/drugmaker-mylan-launching-cheaper-epipenfollowing-price-hike-backlash.html.
31. Arlene Weintraub, EpiPen: Alternatives Snatch up Market Share as Mylan’s Allergy Shot
Falters:
Report,
FIERCEPHARMA
(Mar.
7,
2017,
9:01
AM),
http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/epipen-alternatives-snatch-up-market-share-as-mylan-sallergy-shot-falters-report.
32. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) evaluated the merger and ordered Teva to divest
seventy-nine pharmaceutical products to preserve competition. See Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, FTC Requires Teva to Divest Over 75 Generic Drugs to Settle Competition Concerns
Related to its Acquisition of Allergan’s Generic Business (July 27, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/07/ftc-requires-teva-divest-over-75-genericdrugs-rival-firms-settle.
33. See BRUNO CASSIMAN & MASSIMO G. COLOMBO, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: THE
INNOVATION IMPACT 75 (2006).
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not only worry that industry consolidation increases prices, but also that
it reduces incentives to innovate.34 These commentators express concern
that large pharmaceutical firms exhibited diminishing R&D
productivity—producing fewer discoveries, generating less valuable
discoveries, and creating discoveries that represent more incremental and
duplicative innovations.35 In parallel, commentators suggest that the
recent merger trend contributed to big pharma’s diminishing innovation,
in part because mergers are often followed by layoffs in R&D personnel,
changes in management and research priorities, and reductions in total
R&D spending.36
Our review of data measuring pharmaceutical innovation, however,
tells a different story. First, even as merger activity in the United States
increased over the past ten years, there has been a steady upward trend of
FDA approvals of new molecular entities (“NMEs”) and new biological
products (“BLAs”).37 Hence, the industry has been highly successful in
bringing new products to the market.

34. Giovanni Valentini, Measuring the Effect of M&A on Patenting Quantity and Quality, 33
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 336, 338 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 428 (June 2011).
36. See, e.g., Justus Haucap & Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug
Companies Merge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-innovationsuffers-when-drug-companies-merge (noting that research and development (“R&D”) and
“patenting within the merged entity decline substantially after a merger”); see Peter Loftus et al.,
In Drug Mergers, There’s One Sure Bet: The Layoffs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:12 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304393704579532141039817448 (noting how
many workers have had to seek jobs elsewhere after large pharma mergers).
37. See infra Figure 3 (showing approvals from 1940 to 2015).
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FIGURE 3: Trends in FDA Drug Approvals, 1940–201538
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In addition, the diversity of firms carrying out R&D in the industry
grew strikingly. Figure 4 denotes the status of firms receiving approvals
from the FDA since 1979, and it illustrates the growing importance of
“bio and specialty firms” and of (to a lesser degree) Japanese companies
as drug developers for the United States and other markets. Although
established United States and European firms continue to be important
sources of new products, a vast array of specialized firms, ranging from
large biological companies such as Amgen and Biogen to a globally
distributed set of smaller specialists, now lead the industry. This
fragmentation of the development base reflects both the increasing
complexity of science underlying pharmaceutical products and the
growing global scope of R&D expertise.

38. The peak in 1996–98 occurred following the implementation of the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act (“PDUFA”), which allowed the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to
collect fees from drug manufacturers to fund the new drug approval process and thereby expedite
approvals the cleared out a backlog of applications. The source of the Figure 4’s data is based on
the Authors’ calculations using data from Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.ReportsMe
nu (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Drugs@FDA].
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FIGURE 4: Status of Firms Receiving FDA Drug Approvals (NDAs
& BLAs), 1979–201539
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This fragmentation and diversification of discovery reveals one
significant reason why pharmaceutical M&A activity increased. While
established pharma companies such as Pfizer, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline
(“GSK”), Eli Lilly, and Novartis continue to develop new drugs in their
own labs, they are becoming increasingly dependent on acquiring other
firms to fuel their new product lines. The locus of innovation is shifting
from inside large firms to smaller start-ups and to firms operating in
nontraditional geographic markets and complementary product markets.
As a result, the pharmaceutical industry appears to be in significant
structural transition, and the surge of acquisitions reflects that transition.
A number of forces are contributing to these industry changes. First,
some medical researchers suggest that the frontier of discovery is moving
away from small molecules—which has been the core of large pharma
research—and toward biologics and delivery systems. One reason for
this shift might be diminishing opportunities to discover new molecular
innovations. Some academic physicians believe that the molecular space
available for new discovery for small molecules is finite, and that current
pharmacological technology is pressing against those upper limits.40
Meanwhile, the growth of research on biologics is rapidly expanding, and
39. The source of Figure 5’s data is based on the Authors’ calculations based on data from the
FDA’ report. Id.
40. For a discussion of technical challenges of the small-molecular drug discovery process, see
Swen Hoelder et al., Discovery of Small Molecule Cancer Drugs: Successes, Challenges and
Opportunities, 6 MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY 155, 169 (2012).
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meaningful innovation is coming from research in biological
interventions (some call this the “biological revolution,” as biologicals
constituted more than one third of approvals in 2015). Traditional large
pharmaceutical firms do not have dominant expertise in this scientific
area, and the shift away from small-compound interventions and toward
alternatives means a corresponding shift of innovation away from
established pharmaceutical firms. Thus, established firms must pursue
strategic acquisitions to sustain sales and pursue market opportunities
now available from biological discoveries. The growth of new sources
of discovery creates both growing scientific breadth in the industry’s
underlying knowledge base and increasing market complexity, both
domestically and globally.41
Another significant change in the market for innovation is the decline
in costs and resources required to pursue meaningful innovation. The
growing codification of scientific knowledge has increased the role of
information technology (“IT”) on research. Thus, information for basic
research is much easier both to transmit and to obtain. As a result, startup biotech firms have been able to pursue meaningful innovations while
remaining small. Consequently, competition for discovery of new
pharmaceutical therapies is robust, and consolidation of big pharma
companies does not seem to threaten the competitiveness of this upstream
market for innovation.
Yet while large and established pharmaceutical companies no longer
have the dominant presence in discovery they once did, they still maintain
an important comparative advantage over smaller firms from their
ownership of large-scale marketing networks in multiple countries.
Small firms developing drugs typically do not have the marketing
capabilities required to bring those new drugs to global and segmented
markets on their own. This need for global reach has been accelerated by
the growth of pharmaceutical sales in emerging markets. Where the
major markets were once concentrated in North America, Western
Europe, and Japan, multiple emerging markets in Asia, South America,
and elsewhere are now key targets for global pharmaceutical firms.42
41. Abhirup Chakrabarti & Will Mitchell, A Corporate Level Perspective on Acquisitions and
Integration, in 4 ADVANCES IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1, 4–6 (Sydney Finkelstein & Cary
Cooper eds., 2004); Elena Vidal & Will Mitchell, Adding by Subtracting: The Relationship Between
Performance Feedback and Resource Reconfiguration Through Divestitures, 26 ORG. SCI. 1101,
1101 (2015).
42. QUINTILESIMS, TOP-LINE MARKET DATA: GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET SIZE &
GROWTH BY REGION, 2014–2019, http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/TopLine%20Market%20Data/Global%20Prescription%20Sales%20Information5%20World%20figur
es%20by%20Region%202015-2019.pdf (last visited May 16, 2017) [hereinafter Top-Line Market
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Indeed, China alone is now one of the top three pharmaceutical markets
in the world, about level with Japan and markedly behind only the United
States.43 To succeed, established pharmaceutical companies now require
global reach, while smaller players seeking to expand often need to
acquire regional development and/or commercialization targets. Figure
5 highlights the growing importance of a broader range of pharmaceutical
markets, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, and Figure 6 depicts the
proportion of acquisition targets that were based in the United States,
Western Europe, and Asia between 1991 and 2015. The share of targets
in the United States and Europe declined from over 40 percent each in
the early 1990s to about 20–25 percent by 2015, while the share of targets
based in Asia (other than Japan) grew rapidly, approaching 40 percent in
2015.
FIGURE 5: Trends in Global Pharmaceutical Sales in Billions, 1999–
201544
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43. U.S. DEP’T OF COM.: INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2016 TOP MARKETS SERIES:
PHARMACEUTICALS
COUNTRY
CASE
STUDY
FOR
CHINA
1
(2016),
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_China.pdf.
44. The source of Figure 5’s data was the Authors’ calculations based on data from IMS Health.
Top-Line Market Data, supra note 42.
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FIGURE 6: Trends in Location of M&A Targets by Acquirers, 1991–
201545
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Serving such a disparate global market requires both refinements to
products to suit local demand and local presence for development,
regulatory, and marketing activity. While some of the expansion can
build on existing internal skills or alliances with local partners, creating
a strong local base in multiple markets commonly requires purchasing
firms that already have a relevant presence.
For these reasons, many smaller firms with valuable discoveries opt to
sell their innovative products, and often the entire company, to an
established firm that wants to fill its pipeline.46 Such deals provide an
efficient way to leverage existing investments in marketing systems at the
established companies, and they explain much of the growth in M&A
activity that occurred during the past two decades.47
45. Description
2834:
Pharmaceutical
Preparations,
U.S.
DEPT.
LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=608&tab=description (last visited Apr. 18,
2017) (describing Standard Industry Classification (“SIC”) 2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations)).
The depicted deals total 83 percent of globally reported deals in 2015, with the remaining 17 percent
distributed across the world. The source of Figure 6’s data was the Authors’ calculations based on
Thomson Reuters’ Investment Banking Deal Activity. SDC Platinum Database, supra note 6.
46. LAURENCE CAPRON & WILL MITCHELL, BUILD, BORROW, OR BUY: SOLVING THE
GROWTH DILEMMA 136 (2012).
47. Mid-sized and smaller firms in the sector—not just the traditional big-pharma firms—also
commonly use acquisitions to gain access to capabilities that they need to develop further. In 2015,
for instance, of 506 M&A deals listed in the Thomson Reuters Recap data base, 11 percent of the
buyers were established pharmaceutical industry leaders, 23 percent were mid-sized pharma and
life sciences firms, and 66 percent were smaller firms and diversifying entrants. Hence, M&A is
as much or more part of the means by which newer actors attempt to build new positions in the
sector. Recap Database, supra note 7.
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Another comparative advantage established firms have over start-ups
is their access to the financing required to obtain FDA approval, and
especially to fund Phase-III human trials or large scale trials at earlier
phases. For this reason, start-ups frequently sell their discoveries to large
pharmaceutical firms prior to FDA approval and commercialization.
Accordingly, large pharmaceutical firms are occupying a different role in
drug development. Rather than primarily being creators of innovation—
investing in R&D and managing a soup-to-nuts operation—these firms
are increasingly functioning as purchasers of innovations and are adding
value to the downstream regulatory and commercialization processes.
Perhaps ironically, many of the megamergers contributed to, rather
than squelched, the competitiveness of this process. Mergers often result
in the departures of important executives, and many of those executives
then form new ventures that aid in turning discoveries—often the
discoveries they helped develop before departing to the large company—
into commercialized products. One trend is to form small companies that
purchase the rights to specific compounds, contract with firms to conduct
the appropriate clinical trials to win FDA approval, and then sell to a large
pharmaceutical company for distribution and marketing. Such ventures
are called “virtual companies” because they conduct neither research nor
clinical tests themselves, but manage the development-tocommercialization process through contracting agents. They signal a
new disaggregation of the pharmaceutical industry that dilutes many
concerns for industry concentration.
One remaining question is whether small companies—whether startups engaged in R&D, virtual companies that rely on contracting services,
or even mid-sized clinical trial companies that take ownership of
discoveries—will find the capital to pay for substantial clinical trials.
Even if the industry is moving toward further disaggregation,
megamergers might harm competition if it means fewer parties are
available to finance the development process. But the emergence of
venture capital (“VC”) in the health care sector helps mitigate any
monopsony power that large pharmaceutical companies might have for
new discoveries.
Even though large pharmaceutical firms are
increasingly relying on purchasing rather than producing innovation (it is
likely that over 25 percent of total sales of the twenty largest
pharmaceutical firms now come from in-licensed products), the flow of
VC into the health sector has increased significantly in recent years, with
health sector VC representing 31 percent of total VC investments in
2007.48
48. See infra Figure 7 (noting the annual venture capital investment in the health care sector).
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FIGURE 7: Annual VC Investment in the Health Care Sector, 1998–
2007.

Although the number of VC investors declined during this recent
economic downturn, VC will remain an important part of health care
innovation in the years to come.
Whether VC is a reliable source of funding for Phase III and other
human trials, however, is an open question. Venture capitalists view
FDA review and Medicare and insurance reimbursement policies as
sources of significant risk that steer VC investments toward firms that do
not focus exclusively on health care. Though venture capitalists looked
into funding Phase-III trials, they achieved few successes to date. The
role of VC is especially important because although the market for
discovery is vibrant, it is also fragile, with up to 50 percent of listed firms
at risk of going bankrupt in 2017 and many currently trading at less than
cash value.49 If the finance and VC markets cannot adequately fund the
innovation process, then large pharmaceutical firms with significant cash
on hand and reliable sources of income from currently commercialized
drugs will have an advantage in the market for purchasing discoveries.
Although VC and third-party funding slowed with the current
downturn, companies of all sizes are still able to attract sufficient funding
to carry discoveries forward, and the market should remain vibrant for
players in addition to big pharma firms. This suggests that recent
megamergers have not sufficiently concentrated either the market for
discoveries to harm the rate of innovation. Thus, there remains an
adequate number of parties capable of shepherding discoveries through
49. Michael Brush, Dozens of Biotech Companies are ‘Free’ for Investors Taking,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16, 2016, 9:18 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dozens-ofbiotech-companies-are-free-for-investors-taking-2016-02-16.
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to commercialization.
In short, we are witnessing a major structural change in the locus of
biomedical research. The three trends discussed herein—that innovation
is increasingly occurring within start-ups, that large pharmaceutical
companies are increasingly relying on in-licensed products, and that
megamergers are potentially concentrating the market for buyers of
innovation—will lead to major changes in drug discovery. Although it is
unclear whether megamergers stifled innovation within this new industry
paradigm, the data do not conclusively suggest that mergers have actually
created harm.
IV. DOES M&A ACTIVITY DISRUPT RESEARCH AND PRODUCT
INTRODUCTION?
Even if the surge in recent M&A activity has not reduced industrywide drug approvals, some observers and theorists suggested that M&A
deals might reduce innovative activity by disrupting innovative
capabilities at the firm level. Because acquisitions require organizational
changes at both the target and acquiring firms, many employees from
both sides of a deal commonly seek alternative employment following an
acquisition, either because they chose to move on or because of the
downsizing that often occurs during acquisition integration. Integrating
the different research, development, trials, and regulatory systems of the
target and acquirer, meanwhile, is a complicated task. As a result, there
is potential for disruption in R&D labs, clinical trials units, and other parts
of the newly combined firm.
The question of whether acquisition deals systematically deter
innovative activity is best answered from a longitudinal analysis of
pharmaceutical firm performance. One of the authors in this Article
recorded the number of deals by seventeen firms, including thirteen major
established companies and four substantial pharma specialists, from 1985
to 2009. The seventeen firms undertook 556 M&A deals with reported
value of $67.6 billion during this period. For these same firms, we also
gathered data from 1990 to 2014 for sales ($6.0 trillion revenue in the
twenty-five-year period), R&D expenditures ($946 billion expenditure in
the period), and drug approvals by the FDA (1,213 approvals), as well as
the number of clinical trials initiated from 2000 to 2013 (14,614 trials).
We then investigated whether firms with more acquisition deals had
greater or lesser subsequent innovative activity. We caution that the
investigation is exploratory; we cannot determine causality from the
analysis, but can identify relevant longitudinal patterns.
We first consider the relationship between acquisitions and R&D
expenditures. Panel A of Table 1 shows that firms with more M&A
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activity in a five-year period, whether based on reported value or number
of deals, tended to have lower R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales
the next five years (i.e., the correlations were negative). In Panel B, we
also examined selling, general, and administrative (“SG&A”) costs
during the same period, which track closely with marketing expenditures,
most commonly finding similar negative correlations. The core
implication here is that firms that are most active in acquiring companies
subsequently invested less in both internal R&D and marketing relative
to their sales levels.
TABLE 1: Relationship Between Firms’ Levels of M&A Activity and
Subsequent R&D and SG&A Expenditures as a Percent of Sales
(Seventeen Firms)
Correlations: M&A v. R&D &
SG&A (Lagged Five-Year
Acquisition
Periods)
Value
Acquisition #
Panel A. R&D/Sales Expenditure
Acquisitions, 1985–89 v.
R&D/Sales, 1990–94
-0.10
-0.21
Acquisitions, 1990–94 v.
R&D/Sales, 1995–99
-0.16
-0.32
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v.
R&D/Sales, 2000–04
-0.28
-0.29
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v.
R&D/Sales, 2005–09
-0.37
-0.26
Acquisitions, 2005–2009 v.
R&D/Sales, 2010–13
-0.05
-0.06
Panel B. SG&A/Sales
Expenditure
Acquisitions, 1985–89 v.
SG&A/Sales, 1990–94
0.20
0.25
Acquisitions, 1990–94 v.
SG&A/Sales, 1995–99
-0.15
-0.32
Acquisitions, 1995-99 v.
SG&A/Sales, 2000–04
-0.17
-0.24
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v.
SG&A/Sales, 2005–09
-0.15
-0.04
Acquisitions, 2005–29 v.
SG&A/Sales, 2010–13
0.01
-0.06
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Nonetheless, parsimony in R&D expenditure is not necessarily a
negative sign for product development productivity. Instead, lower R&D
and sales may reflect greater efficiency in R&D investments. The more
important question is whether these acquisition-active firms also had
lower success in bringing new products into clinical trials and, ultimately,
to the market.
Table 2 reports the correlation relationships for three five-year periods
of acquisition and subsequent clinical trial activity. The results in Panel
A, for all clinical trials, suggest that greater M&A activity most
commonly has, at least, a moderately positive relationship with bringing
potential new drugs into human trials. The simplest interpretation is that
acquisitions often help firms gain access to drugs for their clinical trials
pipelines, complementing their internal development activities. Thus,
even though internal R&D/sales ratios may decline, overall introduction
into the clinical pipeline increases with greater M&A activity.
We then investigated whether the patterns differ by stage of clinical
trial to explore whether the acquisitions tend to be targeted early in
development pipelines (Phase I trials) or whether they take place closer
to market entry (Phase III trials). Panel B, examining early-stage Phase
I trials, offers mixed results, with negative relationships for two of three
cohorts by acquisition value, but positive relationships for all cohorts by
number of acquisitions. Panel C, examining later Phase III trials, has
mainly positive correlations. There is some hint here, then, that firms
undertaking larger acquisitions may be focused further down the pipeline
(Phase III), while firms undertaking many smaller deals gain pipeline
opportunities both early and late in the development phases (both Phase
I and III). Overall, acquisitions appear to help firms gain access to
potential products.
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TABLE 2: Relationship Between Firms’ Levels of M&A Activity and
Launching Clinical Trials (Seventeen Firms)
Correlations: M&A v. Clinical
Acquisition Acquisition #
Trials and FDA Approvals
Value
(Lagged Five-Year Periods)

Panel A. All Clinical Trials
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. Clinical
Trials, 2000–04
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. Clinical
Trials, 2005–09
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. Clinical
Trials, 2010–13
Panel B. Phase I Trials
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. Phase I
Trials, 2000–04
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. Phase I
Trials, 2005–09
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. Phase I
Trials, 2010–13
Panel C. Phase III Trials
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. Phase III
Trials, 2000–04
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. Phase III
Trials, 2005–09
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. Phase III
Trials, 2010–13
Panel D. FDA Approvals
Acquisitions, 1985–89 v.
Approvals, 1990–94
Acquisitions, 1990–94 v.
Approvals, 1995–99
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v.
Approvals, 2000–04
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v.
Approvals, 2005–09
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v.
Approvals, 2010–13

-0.13

0.41

0.09

0.30

0.52

0.47

-0.33

0.55

-0.11

0.16

0.25

0.26

0.18

0.01

-0.04

0.23

0.57

0.39

0.39

0.36

0.75

0.48

0.09

0.49

-0.01

0.25

0.51

0.42
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Simply bringing a molecule into clinical trials, however, is no
guarantee of market entry. Even at Phase III, products fail and never
reach the market. Therefore, we examine the correlation between M&A
activity and FDA approvals of new drugs, reported in Panel D. These
correlations are almost all moderately positive. The most direct
implication is that firms most active in M&A activity also are the firms
most capable of bringing new drugs successfully into the market. The
approvals may arise from drug pipelines that acquirers obtain with their
targets. It is also possible, of course, that the opposite causality arises, in
which firms that are most successful in introducing new drugs have
resources needed to undertake more acquisitions. In either direction of
causality, though, it appears that M&A activity is an active part of the
strategy of the firms that are most successful in bringing new products to
market.
These results are consistent with our observations in Part III of this
Article: that acquisitions are often a consequence of, on one hand, the
spread of the industry’s innovation activity across a heterogeneous
spectrum of firms and geographies, and on the other, a sustained
comparative advantage by large traditional firms to bring products
through the regulatory process and to market. These results further
suggest that rather than disrupt innovative activity, M&A activity often
supports product development and market introduction.
A deeper question is whether changes in firms’ M&A activity—such
as a temporal surge in acquisitions—might disrupt their innovation
output. Table 3 measures the effect of whether a change in a firm’s
acquisition activity from one five-year period to the subsequent five-year
period affects either the firm’s clinical trials (reported in Panel A) or
approvals (reported in Panel B). The question examined in Table 3 is
whether firms that increase their rate of acquisitions, whether in value or
number of deals, encounter disruptions as they engage in the extra effort
of integrating their targets.
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TABLE 3: Relationship Between Firms’ Levels of M&A Activity and
Changes in Clinical Trials and FDA Approval (Seventeen Firms)

Change in M&A v. Change in
Clinical Trials & FDA Approvals
(Lagged Five-Year Increases)
Panel A. Change in Clinical
Trials
Acquisition Change, 1995–99 to
2000–04 v. Trials Change, 2000–04
to 2005–09
Acquisition Change, 2000–04 to
2005–09 v. Trials Change, 2005–09
to 2010–13
Panel B. Change in FDA
Approvals
Acquisition Change, 1985–89 to
1990–94 v. Approvals Change,
1990–94 to 1995–99
Acquisition Change, 1990–94 to
1995–99 v. Approvals Change,
1995–99 to 2000–04
Acquisition Change, 1995–99 to
2000–04 v. Approvals Change,
2000–04 to 2005–09
Acquisition Change, 2000–04 to
2005–09 v. Approvals Change,
2005–09 to 2010–14

Acquisition
Value

Acquisition #

0.13

0.01

-0.41

-0.39

0.73

0.36

-0.57

-0.22

0.22

0.25

-0.69

-0.49

The evidence reported in Table 3 is mixed, showing that a change in
acquisition activity has a volatile relationship with change in approvals
and trials, sometimes positive and sometimes negative. The implication
is that ramping up deal making can be helpful, but it also may disrupt
existing routines and practices strongly enough to hamper pipeline
activities.
Recent history offers several examples of both negative and positive
changes arising from accelerated acquisition activity. Pfizer, for instance,
grew its deal-making activity during the early 1990s, with several
moderate-sized deals such as purchasing Schneider NAMIC U.S.A.
Corp. and making equity investments in Neurogen and Incyte, gaining
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technology that led to gains in trials and approvals in the late 1990s.50
The company went through another burst of acquisition activity in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, including deals for Warner-Lambert (gaining
the anti-cholesterol drug Lipitor) and Pharmacia (gaining the antiinflammatory drug Celebrex), which helped the company become the
world’s largest pharmaceutical company.51 But the new growth deals
were followed by a decline in trials and approvals in subsequent years
and Pfizer eventually lost its number one revenue position. Reliance on
gaining products via deal making may have inhibited the ability to bring
new products into the pipeline.
Sometimes, however, what appear to be disruptions can instead
prepare the foundation for future growth. Abbott (now AbbVie)
increased its deal making in the late 1990s, buying multiple companies
and attempting to acquire Alza in 1999 ($7.3 billion).52 Time spent on
due diligence, integration, and break up appears to have detracted
attention from the company’s ongoing clinical activity and slowed
subsequent trials and approvals. Yet this deal activity helped lay the
groundwork for its later acquisition of BASF/Knoll in 2000 (for $6.9
billion), which brought with it the technology that led to trials and
approvals of Humira, which is used to treat rheumatoid arthritis and other
autoimmune diseases, and that subsequently became the world’s top
selling drug later in the 2000s.53 Similarly, Glaxo (now GSK) exhibited
a burst of M&A activity in the late 1990s, particularly with the $14.3
billion acquisition of Burroughs Wellcome in 1994–95.54 The work
required to assess and integrate the deals appeared to have disrupted
subsequent pipeline activity in the early 2000s, but it also laid the
groundwork for future growth, with GSK reaching the status as one of
the world’s most successful pharmaceutical companies during the
2000s.55
Clearly, the negative relationships signal some concern about deal
50. J.A. ROELS, THE ORIGIN AND THE EVOLUTION OF FIRMS: INFORMATION AS A DRIVING
FORCE 164 (2012).
51. Matthew Herper, Pfizer Buys Pharmacia for $60 Billion, FORBES (July 15, 2002, 7:53 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/2002/07/15/0715pfe.html.
52. James P. Miller, Abbott Laboratories to Purchase Alza for Stock Worth $7.3 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (June 22, 1999, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB930002503336706177.
53. Thomas M. Burton, Abbott Laboratories Agrees to Buy BASF’s Knoll Pharmaceutical Unit,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2000, 12:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB976832374667325423.
54. Richard W. Stevenson, Glaxo Offers $14 Billion for Wellcome, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/24/business/company-news-glaxo-offers-14-billion-forwellcome.html.
55. Sylvia Pfeifer, The Drugs Don’t Work for GlaxoSmithKline, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 9, 2007,
12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/migrationtemp/2815417/The-drugs-dont-workfor-GlaxoSmithKline.html.
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activity, but it is important not to overstate the concerns. Once firms
settle at a new rate of deal activity, they are likely to learn how to handle
the new level and return to more positive patterns. Nonetheless, the
patterns do raise cautionary notes for pharmaceutical managers. They
also offer warning signals for antitrust regulators that are being told of
efficiencies purported to arise from a proposed merger.
V. UNTRADITIONAL SOURCES OF ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM: MARKETING
AND REGULATORY BOTTLENECKS
The previous three Parts of this Article suggest that broad trends in
pharmaceutical acquisitions, and recent megamergers in particular, do
not present traditional competition concerns for pharmaceutical prices
and output. Research and discovery remain robust, albeit commonly
from small firms pursuing large molecules and biologics rather than the
small molecule discoveries that built the current pharmaceutical giants.
Reductions in the cost of doing research, actualized by merging two
research departments into one, enable entry and facilitate active
competition for new discoveries. Even if the internal research
productivity of some large pharmaceutical companies has declined, these
firms have also become purchasers of innovation. This is true even as
these firms continue as creators of innovation, and their purchases fuel
the discovery process and enable the commercialization of many new
products. The rise of virtual companies, companies that contract to do
Phase-III human trials, and other small facilitating companies (some
staffed by executives who were dismissed by newly merged giants) built
an active and competitive market for commercializing discoveries. And
even if a surge in firm M&A activity sometimes dulls innovative
productivity, acquisitions appear to be an important part of both
sustaining product development and even laying the foundation for longterm innovation activity. These developments mitigated most concerns
that megamergers would reduce the competitiveness of discovery.
This Part explores two additional sources of concern about the sector’s
growing merger activity: whether industry concentration in marketing
and distributing pharmaceuticals will distort consumption (and thereby
increase prices or disrupt innovation strategies), and whether industry
concentration causes regulatory bottlenecks that result in anticompetitive
consequences.
A. New Systems of Distribution
Pharmaceutical sales remain highly influenced by the effectiveness of
targeted marketing, and large pharmaceutical companies have therefore
invested heavily in specialized sales forces. Many companies treat these
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investments as fixed costs that cannot vary with the firm’s research
productivity, so firms purchase discoveries to maximally utilize the sales
force capacities. Treating sales forces as fixed costs that would go
unutilized without actively marketed products is one leading explanation
for the steady frequency of acquisitions and the surge of megamergers.
The importance of sales forces accordingly attracts competition
concerns when two companies with significant marketing operations
decide to merge. Concentration in the market for pharmaceutical sales
and distribution might lead to market power and all of its ill effects,
including squeezing out superior competing products, higher prices,
foreclosing possible entry by innovative competitors, and diminished
consumer choice. But two significant changes in the marketing of
pharmaceuticals might alleviate these competition concerns, and these
mergers instead might reflect large pharmaceutical companies’ shared
perception that the industry has great excess marketing capacity that is
being displaced by alternative distribution mechanisms.
One recent development affecting, and perhaps blindsiding,
pharmaceutical marketing is the growing popularity of health care IT,
including the proliferation of medical protocols.
Whereas
pharmaceutical marketing relies on the assumption that physicians
prescribe drugs based on personal familiarity and comfort with certain
compounds, the growth of electronic medical protocols would lead
physicians to instead rely on codified instructions disseminated through
IT systems.
The promise of IT to transform the delivery of medicine is not a new
idea—health policy analysts have long been enthusiastic about its
potential to bring more consistency to medical services, reduce errors,
and constrain costs. And even as entrenched barriers impede the spread
of systematized IT medicine,56 including the training of doctors, the use
of IT and electronic standardized protocols is growing in several systems,
such as Kaiser Permanente’s HealthConnect program. Moreover,
enthusiasm for, and recent investments in, cost-effectiveness research
might also stimulate greater use of electronic protocols. If costeffectiveness research can document the comparative usefulness of
alternative regimens, then electronic protocols would swiftly spread the
information and standardize treatments.
The growing importance of PBMs also marks a change in how drugs
are prescribed and consumed. PBMs purchase drugs in bulk on behalf of
insurers and use formularies and coverage tiering to direct insureds (and
56. Susan Denzter, Health Information Technology: On the Fast Track at Last?, 28 HEALTH
AFF. 320, 320 (2009).
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thus prescribing physicians) toward certain prescriptions. The rise of
PBMs leaves less latitude to physicians and patients in selecting
particular drugs for prescriptions and means that companies must now
direct pharmaceutical marketing information at PBMs, rather than
individual physicians. A similar development occurred in the early
1990s, when the Clinton Health Plan proposed greater monitoring and
restrictions on the selection of prescriptions.57 Large pharmaceutical
companies recognized that prescription selections would reduce the value
of large sales forces, and these firms transferred investments away from
traditional marketing and toward purchases of PBMs. The attempts to
use the PBMs to generate profitability failed dismally, however, and the
three major pharmaceutical companies that acquired PBMs
(SmithKlineBeecham, Eli Lilly, and Merck) subsequently divested or
spun them off, typically at losses or with significantly lower market
capitalization than their acquisition costs. In turn, though, the PBM
sector is now a vibrant part of the pharmaceutical value chain, including
standalone PBMs and PBMs that are units within health insurance
companies and drug store chains. Thus, the failed acquisitions of the
PBMs by pharmaceutical leaders did not lead to failure of industry
structure. Instead, the failures led to successful changes in market
structure.
The impact of cost-effectiveness research, the growing use of IT, and
the consolidated drug selections and purchases by PBMs could
potentially obviate the need for vast marketing teams and sales forces.
The information required by treating physicians would be transmitted by
electronic mechanisms rather than in-person instruction sessions with
sales representatives, and many prescription decisions might be removed
from individual physicians altogether and instead given to well-informed
bulk purchasers. Large pharmaceutical companies might have already
recognized that these seismic changes are afoot, and their pursuit of
recent megamergers might reflect their need to address overcapacity in
marketing and sales. This would mean that market concentration in this
downstream market should not translate into anticompetitive
consequences.
While it is still unknown how significantly information systems will
impact physician treatments and the issuances of pharmaceutical
prescriptions, the growth of electronic protocols is potentially another
major development that could transform the competitive structure of the
pharmaceutical industry. An accurate competitive analysis would have
57. Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH
AFF. 9, 10 (1994).
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to take these changes into account, and future research could fruitfully
examine the effect of electronic protocols both on physician behavior and
on the usefulness of pharmaceutical sales representatives.
B. The Remaining Bottleneck: FDA Approval
The one area that seems to have the potential for competitive harm
through market concentration is the process of obtaining regulatory
approval. We interviewed several industry experts deeply familiar with
the regulatory process. Consistent with discussions in the health services
literature,58 the experts suggest that the regulatory process remains a
nonstandardized, and even personalized, process. It consequently
rewards certain competencies that are in short supply and difficult to
replicate. As one expert on the regulatory process remarked:
I don’t think you’ll ever do away with the need of regulatory specialists
who interface between your data and decision making. [This will
become increasingly important as] we not only have approval but we
have payment, which has been connected in Europe for a while, [and]
it’s going to be connected in the U.S. It has to be. And so you’ll need
people who can navigate that no matter what.59

Others we interviewed expressed a similar concern, that the regulatory
process remains a bottleneck, in part because of the complexity of the
regulatory demands and the differences in regulatory requirements across
jurisdictions. While many contract research organizations have expertise
in the regulatory process at the FDA, each class of products requires
specific regulatory insight and knowledge. Consequently, recent entrants
to the value chain for drug commercialization are challenged to translate
industry success into an effective interface with regulators. Although
there appears to be entry into the markets for discovery and
commercialization, it is less apparent that there is effective entry into this
regulatory phase that requires nonmarket capabilities.
With the recent passage of the 21st Century Cures Act,60 the FDA will
soon institute some reforms on its drug approval process. Perhaps this
regulatory reform will reduce the centrality of certain skills, relationships,
and knowhow that facilitates the FDA and other government agency
approvals. Perhaps it will make the regulatory approval process more
accessible to developers, thereby increasing meaningful competition.
58. See generally Robert M. Califf, Benefit-Risk Assessments at the US Food and Drug
Administration: Finding the Balance, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 693, 693 (2017) (noting the FDA’s
“system of rigorous, independent premarket assessment” that it uses when making marketing
decisions).
59. Interview with Barak Richman, Will Mitchell, Elena Vidal, and Kevin Schulman (Spring
2009).
60. Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
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But the novel technologies envisioned by the 21st Century Cures Act will
require the development of new predictable, scientific, and transparent
approval pathways. The presence of a regulatory bottleneck does expose
a vulnerability to market concentration. If few firms possess the ability
to navigate through the regulatory process, then mergers among those
firms could translate into harm to competition. Our interviews suggest
that the regulatory process and the possibilities for regulatory reform
deserve attention as the consequences of megamergers are evaluated and
scrutinized.
Market access through the reimbursement process of public and
private payors is an additional hurdle to product adoption and uptake in
the market. Similar to the regulatory process, the reimbursement process
requires specialized insights and knowledge that provide additional
uncertainty in the economic model for drug development. This
specialized knowledge and additional risk posed by this step could also
inhibit investment in early stage life sciences companies.
CONCLUSION
The global pharmaceutical industry is exhibiting meaningful structural
changes, evidenced most clearly by ongoing growth in industry-wide
M&A deals. This exploratory review finds evidence that the predominant
concerns over megamergers among pharmaceutical giants might be
misplaced. Changes in the scientific landscape of competitive innovation
generated a vibrant marketplace for discovery, which megamergers do
not necessarily threaten and instead might actually invigorate. Although
megamergers may create some monopsony power for the purchase of
discoveries, an active VC and biotech financing market, along with
speculating contract research organizations and virtual companies, would
counteract that. And the development of alternative information
mechanisms to spread pharmaceutical information and effectiveness
data, which would inform physicians and bulk purchasers of drugs,
reduces the importance of pharmacy sales representatives, thus mitigating
any competition concerns with downstream drug marketing and
distribution.
These are some of the structural changes transforming the
pharmaceutical industry, so any evaluation of mergers and market
concentration would need to consider a wide array of dynamic forces.
Among the other significant developments on the industry’s horizon
include the potential for regulated pricing on small molecules, including
reference pricing in reimbursement policies and direct negotiations in
Medicare Part D; the rising potential of biosimilars (generic biological
drugs) and competition among biologics, which began several years ago
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in Europe and Canada following the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency and Health Canada’s approvals and is now beginning to occur in
the United States; emerging export markets in Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (“BRICS”) and a changing international
marketing landscape; and the all-important possibility of health reform,
particularly as it might change the market and demand for biologics.
Partially because of this rapidly changing industry, and also partially
because of the exploratory nature of this inquiry, this review of industry
mergers identified few strong conclusions. Nonetheless, it identifies
several areas for important future research: (1) whether there is an
efficient finance market for the commercialization of drugs, and whether
mergers create monopsony power for discoveries, or whether other
industry players can emerge to commercialize discoveries; similarly,
whether health care VC matures to promote promising technologies, or
whether reimbursement and regulatory risk continue to drive VC dollars
away from the health care sector; (2) how IT and electronic protocols will
affect physician behavior, how they might standardize treatments and
reduce costs, and how cost-effectiveness research affects these protocols;
additionally, whether the introduction of IT can affect physician behavior
at all, or if the training of physicians needs to change to capitalize on the
potential efficiencies from IT and electronic protocols; and (3) how the
regulatory process is changing, precisely why there are some firms able
to achieve regulatory approval whereas others cannot, and why regulatory
interface remains a scare competency, and how the regulatory process
could be streamlined to reduce bottleneck effects and vulnerability to
market concentration. These questions should guide future inquiries into
how merger activity and other dynamic market changes will shape
industry performance and whether those changes translate into a clear
direction for innovation and competition policy.

